Days Thirty Two and Thirty Three - Troubled times in Iraqi Kurdistan

This week's elections in Iraqi Kurdistan could destroy one of its ruling parties – unless Iraq's Kurdish president steps in.

Ranj Alaaldin - Guardian.co.uk

On Saturday, Iraqi Kurdistan holds its parliamentary and presidential elections. Two parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP), have historically governed the region with unassailable power and are joining forces under one list for these elections. They will almost certainly be returned to power by the voters.

Though the status quo is likely to continue for a while, in the longer term there are serious questions to be asked about the future of the PUK. Formed in 1975 by Jalal Talabani (now Iraqi president) it started off as a leftist umbrella organisation and gradually became a centrist social democratic movement.

Since its inception the PUK has overcome numerous threats to its existence, including breakaway groups in the 1980s, civil war with the KDP in the mid-1990s, and a Baghdad dictatorship up until 2003. Now, as well as being a major force within Kurdish politics, the party also has a commanding presence in Baghdad politics through Talabani's presidency and the deputy premiership of Dr Barham Salih.

Despite its achievements, the PUK is plagued with discontent and division. Talabani, in charge of the party for nearly 34 years, has been denounced for holding unaccountable power and privileges, and now sees criticism transformed into resignations and a factional battle that pits so-called reformists against his so-far loyal circle of followers. Despite umpteen promises, and much to the dismay of party officials, Talabani has continuously delayed holding a PUK congress. The restlessness showed in February when four senior-ranking officials resigned in protest against the lack of reform.

As it stands, the lethargic PUK, led by an ailing leader, plays second fiddle to the financially more powerful, organised, effective and systematically-run KDP, led by Massoud Barzani, which is on course to become the only source of authority within the region. Discontent may exist within the KDP too, but it is not easily identifiable. KDP members unconditionally accept that they operate within an uncompromising hierarchical system. Talabani may still see no reason to concede, however. Despite countless challenges to his leadership over the past 10 years, his hold on power has so far remained unscathed.

But post-2003 Iraq presents a dramatically altered reality for Talabani and his party. Talabani's former deputy and co-founder of the PUK, Newshirwan Mustafa, an intellectual who led a significant faction within the PUK, has left the party, formed his own list to contest the elections, and taken his followers with him. Like others before him, Mustafa attempted to change the party from within, but failed. Now, his "Change" list, backed by a powerful media platform, offers voters an alternative with promises of reform and modernisation.

The uncertainty that Mustafa has injected into the PUK – and the current election – could complicate things with devastating effect. He gives a discontent electorate the chance to voice their disenchantment in unprecedented fashion and could thus attract the protest vote, particularly in his hometown, but also the PUK stronghold province of Sulaymania.

The consequences would be far-reaching: a disgraced PUK would lose its commanding presence in parliament, lose the confidence of the electorate and give way to unchecked KDP dominance. The party could, therefore, find itself rapidly and irreversibly deteriorating. Of course, the PUK could still perform well at the polls, and is likely to do so, but there is another matter that could help to trigger the PUK's destruction – the choice of Kurdistan's next regional prime minister.

The PUK and KDP, as a coalition government, have a number of agreements to divide key governmental positions equally between them. The Kurdistan region presidency, for example, is held by the KDP in return for its support for a Talabani presidency in Baghdad. Most important of all is the KRG premiership which carries a host of decision-making powers. A KDP official, Nechirvan Barzani, also holds this position. He should have relinquished the role to the PUK in 2008 but, with Talabani's consent and against the will of PUK politburo members, is to carry on until after the elections; the understanding was that he would then make way for leading PUK candidate Barham Salih.

However, these power-sharing arrangements will start to break down if the PUK becomes perceived as a party in decline and, in light of the current climate of tumultuousness surrounding the PUK, the KDP is still yet to publicly endorse any PUK candidate; in accordance with strategic nous, it will push to keep its options open rather than commit to any agreement at a time of great uncertainty for its historic rival.

Of note is that Talabani has so far remained indifferent to this and as a result leaves himself vulnerable to targeted exploitation and pressure by the KDP which could aim for increased concessions. In doing so, the concern is that, with his back to the wall and confidence almost lost in party cadres, Talabani considers the PUK beyond repair and sacrificial, and is now focused on a power-hoarding process that secures another presidential term and, in the longer-run, personal rather than PUK interests that extend beyond the political arena. Specifically, discontent members fear that Talabani is looking ahead and in anticipation of a power-struggle within the PUK is grooming his son to be his successor. He may therefore acquiesce to a KDP premiership to secure long-term family interests, irrespective of the election outcome.

But inaction is not an option for the PUK. Failure to get the premiership, reinvigorate itself and failure to act astutely and decisively could individually and/or collectively trigger the complete breakdown of the party. The PUK could soon find itself with a disillusioned electorate that no longer takes it seriously and a humiliated rank and file that no longer will be content with another four years of increased KDP political prowess while the PUK destroys itself. For Talabani, it is no longer feasible to rely on patronage and sycophants; it is nigh time for him to choose between becoming either the PUK's greatest asset or its greatest liability.